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Abstract 
This paper constructs a simple model that can account for both the negative relationship 
between growth and income inequality observed in the cross-country data and the 
positive relationship observed within countries over time.  The model employs a dual-
economy structure with formal and informal sectors.  Growth is driven by formal sector 
human capital spillovers.  Restrictive institutions impose barriers to formality that reduce 
the growth rate and increase inequality.  Redistributive taxation lowers inequality but 
blunts the incentive to accumulate, lowering growth.  Institutional structures vary more 
across than within countries.  Consequently, variations in institutional barriers to 
formality may account for the negative relationship between growth and inequality found 
in the cross-country data.  Variations in the intensity of redistribution may account for the 
positive relationship observed within countries over time.  
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1  
Section I.  Introduction 
 
The empirical work on income inequality and economic growth finds, alternately, 
that they are positively related, negatively related and not related.  The profusion of 
conflicting evidence leads Banerjee and Duflo (2000, page 17) to ask rhetorically, “Is 
there anything then, apart from the obvious fact of disagreement, that we can take away 
from this body of evidence?”  This paper proposes that rather than being an “obvious 
fact,” the disagreement apparent in the empirical work on inequality and growth is 
illusory.  It does so by developing a simple model that provides a consistent account of 
the stylized facts regarding growth and inequality.   
The primary theoretical barrier to understanding the nature of this relationship has 
been a strict division of theoretical labor in which theorists have tended to treat either 
growth or inequality as given.  One line of research, follows Kuznets’ (1956) emphasis 
on the dynamics of dualistic development.
1  In these models, the evolution of inequality 
is investigated while modern sector expansion, a proxy for rising income levels, is treated 
as automatic.  The other line of research, in the tradition of Kaldor (1956), investigates 
the possible channels through which the initial distribution of income might influence 
subsequent accumulation and growth.
2  In some of these models inequality may evolve as 
the initial distribution converges to a stable or ergodic distribution, but it is treated as 
independent of policy variables.  As Lundberg and Squire (2003, p. 326) note in a recent 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Knight (1976), Robinson (1976), Bourguignon (1990) and Rauch (1993).   
2 This literature explores a variety of mechanisms through which inequality might influence growth, 
including its impact on fiscal policy (Persson and Tabellini 1994, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Bourguignon 
2 empirical paper, “Neither approach is particularly convincing from a theoretical 
standpoint:  the evolution of growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar 
processes.” 
This paper proposes a new theoretical framework in which both inequality and 
growth are treated as endogenous functions of underlying policy variables.  This 
approach adds a degree of conceptual freedom to the frameworks described above, and as 
a result makes it a relatively straightforward exercise to develop a model that accounts for 
the empirical record in a coherent and consistent fashion.  Indeed, I describe a set of 
sufficient conditions for a family of models that does so.  I also develop one such model 
in detail as an illustration.   
At the broadest level, the paper suggests that there may not be a fixed relationship 
between inequality and growth.  If this is true, then there is not a meaningful answer to 
the question that has occupied so much of the recent work in this area, Persson and 
Tabillini’s (1994) query, “Is inequality harmful for growth?”  It may be more useful to 
ask instead, “Are the particular conditions that give rise to inequality in a given country 
good or bad for growth?”   
This difference of approach may help to put at ease those economists who find 
themselves uncomfortable with the implications of either a positive or a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth.  If one accepts the evidence of a negative 
relationship, for example, does this mean that Germany could grow faster if only it 
expanded its welfare system?  Alternately, should we interpret evidence of a positive 
relationship to mean that growth in less developed countries benefits from the economic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and Verdier 2000, Benabou 2000), socio-political instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996), and misallocations 
of credit Piketty 1997, Aghion and Bolton 1997).  See Barro (2000) for a recent overview. 
3 marginalization of large segments of the population?  As these examples are intended to 
suggest, the direct impact of inequality on growth may matter less than the impact of the 
variables that determine a country’s level of inequality.   
To the best of my knowledge, Lundberg and Squire (2003) is the only other paper 
to consider both growth and inequality as endogenous.  Unlike this paper, they critique 
the existing empirical literature, rather than explaining how it arrived at apparently 
contradictory results, and do not attempt to develop a theoretical model.   
  The next section describes the primary “stylized facts” of growth and inequality, 
outlines the characteristics of a family of models consistent with these facts, and selects a 
particular member of this family for further investigation.  The third section solves the 
model and discusses its relationship to the evidence.  The final section concludes.   
 
Section II.  The Conceptual Framework 
 
Stylized Facts of Growth and Inequality 
 
Fact 1:  Across countries, growth and inequality vary inversely.   
 
The first stylized fact is supported by cross-country growth regressions in which 
initial inequality is negatively and significantly related to subsequent growth.
3  That is, 
more equal economies grow faster.  Despite the large number of studies that find support 
for this stylized fact, it should not be interpreted as a causal relationship.  Several 
                                                           
3 See for example Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Clarke (1995), Perotti (1996).  
Benabou (1996) provides a summary of the cross-country evidence. 
4 researchers have found that this relationship is not robust, being sensitive to the inclusion 
of additional explanatory variables, such as regional dummy variables (Deiniger and 
Squire, 1998) and measures of fertility (Barro 2000, de la Croix and Doepke 2003).  
Furthermore, as Forbes (2000) points out, cross-country growth regressions are 
particularly prone to omitted variable bias.  In particular, she notes that omitted variables 
that are “positively correlated with inequality and negatively correlated with growth” will 
negatively bias the coefficient on initial inequality (page 870).   
 
Fact 2:  Within countries, growth and inequality vary directly.   
 
The second stylized fact is supported by Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000).  
These studies use panel estimation techniques (fixed effects and general method of 
moments, respectively), and find that within countries growth rises with inequality.  
These findings are important because their use of country-specific intercepts controls for 
the effect of time-invariant omitted variables that may bias the cross-country results as 
noted above.  Forbes’ (2000) treatment is particularly compelling, considering a variety 
of data, sampling and specification issues and isolating omitted variable bias as the 
primary source of the difference in outcome, rather than data quality or choice of 
ancillary variables.   
 
Fact 3:  Inequality varies vastly more across than within countries.   
 
5 Li, Squire and Zou (1998) report that inequality is relatively constant within 
countries during the post-war period.  Indeed, using Deininger and Squire’s (1996) “high-
quality” data set, Li et al. find that “about 90% of the total variance in the Gini 
coefficients can be explained by variation across countries, while only a small percentage 
of the total variance is due to variation over time” (p. 26-27).   
The third stylized fact has a number of implications for how we view the first two.  
First, as Li et al. note, their finding suggests that inequality is primarily determined by 
factors that differ across countries rather than time.  This supports the idea that time-
invariant omitted variables may be driving the negative relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth found in cross-country growth regressions.  Second, it 
reduces the importance we should place on the second fact.  The positive relationship 
between inequality and growth within countries found using panel methods, while 
arguably based on better econometric techniques, is in fact only a small part of the overall 
story.   
 
A Family of Models  
This subsection describes a set of assumptions that collectively constitute 
sufficient conditions for a model that is able to account for the three stylized facts noted 
above.  Since these assumptions are general in nature, they may be thought of describing 
a family of “endogenous inequality-endogenous growth” models that is broadly 
consistent with the empirical evidence.
4   
                                                           
4 Banerjee and Duflo (2000) argue that the findings of the cross-country and panel studies are consistent 
with a political economy model in which growth falls in response to a change in inequality.  There is no 
reason to think of their explanation as competing with the one proposed here.  Their model does not attempt 
to account for our third stylized fact, the greater variation in inequality across than within countries.  
6 Assumption 1:  There is a set of exogenous variables, X, such that for x ∈ X, 
, where g is a country’s growth rate and G is its Gini coefficient. That is, a 
change in x moves growth and inequality in opposite directions.  
0 / < x x G g
Assumption 2: There is a set of exogenous variables, Y, such that for y ∈ Y, 
.  That is, a change in y moves growth and inequality in the same direction.  0 / > y y G g
Assumption 3:  X rather than Y is the “primary determinant” of inequality, in the 
sense that variations in X are responsible for most of the observed variation in inequality.  
Assumption 4:  X varies substantially across countries and is relatively constant 
within countries over time, while Y varies either primarily over time or relatively equally 
in both dimensions.   
Assumptions 1 and 4 support the first stylized fact.  If the variables constituting X 
are omitted, cross-country growth regressions will report an inverse relationship between 
growth and inequality.  Assumptions 2 and 4 support the second stylized fact.  Since X is 
relatively stable within countries over time, the results using panel methods will be driven 
by variations in Y, which generate a positive relationship between growth and inequality.  
Assumptions 3 and 4 support the third stylized fact:  inequality will vary more across 
than within countries.  
Note that no assumption is made here about a direct impact of inequality on 
growth or vice-versa.  With growth and inequality treated as endogenous variables, a 
direct relationship between them is not necessary to account for the stylized facts noted 
above.  As a result, our assumptions imply that both cross-country and panel regressions 
are mis-specified in that the impact of inequality on growth is driven by omitted 
variables. However, it should be stressed that the assumptions listed above are only one 
7 set of possible sufficient conditions.  There is, in particular, no reason to rule out a 
“small” positive effect of inequality on growth.
5   
 
Section 3:  Variable Selection – Institutions and Redistribution 
 
As the discussion above suggests, it should be possible to find several variables 
that satisfy the conditions set on X and Y.  This supposition is supported by a recent 
empirical study by Lundberg and Squire (2003) that, like this paper, adopts the 
assumption that both growth and inequality are endogenous.  Their research finds that 
changes in education, inflation and land inequality are associated with desirable changes 
in both growth and inequality, and thus meet two of the requirements for X in 
Assumption 1, while changes in the Sachs-Warner index of openness and the Gastil index 
of civil liberties involve a growth-inequality trade-off, as suggested for Y in the second 
assumption (p. 338-9).  Their paper, however, does not consider whether the variables 
examined adhere to Assumptions 3 and 4, so it is unclear whether these variables can 
explain the relative variation of inequality across and within countries or the apparent 
contradiction in the evidence to date.   
 
The Choice of Y – Redistributive Taxation  
Clarity of intuition guides our choice of Y as redistributive taxation.  Proportional 
income taxation coupled with uniform transfers redistributes income progressively, 
reducing the inequality of post-transfer income, with the degree of progressivity 
                                                           
5 Such an effect might be driven, for example, by the influence of inequality on the aggregate saving rate, 
as suggested by Kaldor (1956), though the evidence on this is mixed, e.g. Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 
8 increasing in the tax rate.  Income taxes also reduce the return to capital, blunting the 
incentive for accumulation and reducing the growth rate.  In a simple model, variations in 
the income tax rate result in a positive relationship between inequality and growth:  
higher tax rates correspond to greater equality and slower growth.   
Despite the simple intuition, the argument that redistribution blunts growth is 
controversial.  With frictionless capital markets, taxes on capital income will decrease 
growth by distorting investment decisions (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994).  However, with capital market imperfections, redistribution or the 
public provision of education may allow the poor to overcome constraints, increasing the 
growth rate.
6  Moreover, the balance of the empirical evidence suggests that transfers 
increase growth; see Benabou (1996) for an overview.  Perotti (1996) for example reports 
that growth rates are increasing for a variety of variables measuring tax rates and 
explicitly redistributive expenditures, a finding that is “difficult to rationalize with most 
of the existing theories.”  (page 171).   
Though this gap between theory and empirics is troubling, it may be accounted 
for by a corresponding gap between redistribution and its empirical proxies.  Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994, p. 479) suggest that, properly measured, redistribution includes elements 
not captured by tax rates or welfare spending, such as labor law, minimum wages, trade 
policy and the structure of government spending.  Indeed, this list might be expanded to 
include inflationary spending, the maintenance of multiple exchange rates, corruption, 
favoritism in government contracts, and some portion of the wage bills of state-owned 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2000) and Smith (2001). 
6 For a sampling of this literature, much of which endogenizes tax rates, see Perotti (1993), Aghion and 
Bolton (1997), and Benabou (2000), and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).  Saint Paul and Verdier (1996) 
9 enterprises.  As Alesina and Rodrik (1994, p. 479) note, “It would be an almost 
impossible task to construct a meaningful cross-country index for the totality of such 
measures.”  With this consideration in mind, we assume the intensity of redistribution to 
have the intuitive negative relationships with growth and inequality.    
 
The Choice of X - Restrictive Institutions  
The choice of X is motivated primarily by Sokoloff and Engermann’s (2000) 
study of relative development in North and South America.  Sokoloff and Engermann 
argue that factor endowments and the resulting level of economic and political inequality 
at the time of colonization led to divergent paths of institutional and economic 
development.  In particular, high initial inequality “contributed to the evolution of 
institutions that protected the privileges of the elites and restricted opportunities for the 
broad mass of the population to participate fully in the commercial economy” (p. 221).  
Sokoloff and Engermann suggest that the effect of such institutions was to increase 
inequality while retarding development:  “Members of the elites were better able to 
maintain their elite status over time, but at the cost of society not realizing the full 
economic potential of disadvantaged groups” (p. 228-230). 
As required by Assumption 4, most of the variance in restrictive institutions is 
likely to be across rather than within countries, at least over the lengths of time typically 
investigated in growth empirics.  Indeed, institutional persistence is a central theme in the 
work on institutions and growth.  North (1990) attributes institutional stability to 
increasing returns, broadly construed, which generates multiple stable institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                             
critiques the political economy literature on inequality, redistribution and growth.  Benabou (1996) 
provides a comprehensive overview of the issues involved and empirical findings.   
10 equilibria. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) provide empirical support for a high 
degree of institutional persistence and suggest a number of mechanisms that could lead to 
institutional persistence, including sunk costs, complementarities with existing 
investments, and continuity of the size or identity of local elites.  Complementarities 
between formal institutions and highly persistent informal institutions may also 
contribute to institutional stability.   
The idea that institutional quality affects economic growth is also well 
established, e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Rodrik (2000), Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Easterly (2001).  The restrictiveness of institutions, 
however, is likely to capture institutional variation along a somewhat different dimension 
than that implied by “institutional quality,” which often treated as synonymous with the 
protection of property rights.  To cite just one example, the abolition of slavery in the US 
both reduced institutional restrictiveness and violated previously protected property 
rights.  In practice, however, elements of high quality institutions such as an independent 
judiciary and the rule of law require an egalitarianism that is likely to be incompatible 
with highly restrictive institutions, suggesting that institutional quality and restrictiveness 
will be negatively correlated.  The indices of institutional quality used in empirical work, 
e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995), are often broadly defined and appear to capture aspects of 
institutions closely linked to restrictiveness, such as corruption and bureaucratic quality.  
Thus, evidence that institutional quality matters for growth may be interpreted as tacit 
support that restrictive institutions do as well. 
There are several arguments that restrictive institutions increase income 
inequality.  Engermann and Sokoloff (1997) find that restrictive institutions manifest 
11 themselves through an influence on land tenure and settlement, the provision of public 
education, the regulation and governance of commercial and financial organizations, and 
restrictions on political participation.  Empirically, Li et al. (1998) find that a large 
proportion of the variation in income inequality is accounted for by variables that may be 
viewed as reflecting the effects of restrictive economic and political institutions:  land 
inequality, financial development, educational attainment and civil liberties.  
Engermann and Sokoloff’s list also accords nicely with a number of themes in the 
theoretical literature.  Unequal access to credit is at the heart of the literature on 
inequality and capital market imperfections.  This literature also stresses the importance 
of an equitable distribution of land, an important source of collateral, and publicly funded 
education as means to overcome credit constraints.  Finally, an important line of the 
research on political economy and inequality, e.g. Benabou (2000), Bourguignon and 
Verdier (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), gives a central role to unequal or 
restricted political participation.   
This brief discussion suggests that restrictive institutions are a plausible candidate 
for the variable X:  they are relatively stable within countries over time, positive related 
to inequality, and negatively related to growth.  As enumerated above, however, 
restrictive institutions are too diverse in their effects to incorporate in a single model.  For 
this reason I focus on a particular form of restriction:  regulatory barriers to formal sector 
participation.  
The pioneering work of Hernando de Soto (1990) provides a contemporary 
account of the impact of restrictive institutions on informal sector participation.  De Soto 
documents the various regulatory and bureaucratic barriers encountered in an attempt to 
12 register a small (fictitious) business in Peru.  His conclusion that regulation and red tape 
pose a significant barrier to formal sector participation is compelling:  the cost of 
complying with existing regulations equaled 28 times the monthly minimum wage.   
A number of cross-country studies provide evidence in support of de Soto’s 
hypothesis.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shliefer (2002) find that regulatory 
barriers to entry, as measured by the number of procedures, and time and cost of 
compliance, is positively related to informal sector size and employment.  They also find 
that the intensity of regulation is negatively correlated with measures of good governance 
typically used as measures of institutional quality, for example constraints on executive 
power.  Further evidence linking regulation to informality is reported by Johnson, 
Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), Johnson, Kaufman and Shliefer (1997) and the 
World Bank (2004).   
The intuitive link between informality and inequality, suggested by terms such as 
“underemployment” and “marginality,” has not been extensively researched.  However, 
two recent papers by Rosser, Rosser and Ahmed (2000, 2003), report a positive 
relationship between levels and changes in income inequality and informal sector share in 
transition economies.  Ahmed, Rosser and Rosser (2004) extend this analysis, finding 
that the informal sector share is a significant determinant of income inequality in a 
sample of 52 countries.  
With its focus on the relationships between institutions, informality, inequality 
and growth, this paper is related to several lines of research.  A number of papers have 
investigated the relationships between institutions, inequality, and growth, but their 
emphasis has been on how inequality influences institutions, e.g. Easterly (2001), 
13 Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shliefer (2003), Keefer and Knack (2002).  Here, causation 
runs in the opposite direction, from institutions to inequality.  Furthermore, none of these 
papers consider the link between institutions and informality.   
The model is also related to the growing literature on informality.
7  A central 
issue in this literature is the role of taxation in informality.  Johnson et al. (1997) and 
Dessy and Palange (2003) find that formal sector taxation has an ambiguous effect on 
sectoral participation when tax revenues fund productive public goods.  Both models 
support multiple equilibria with high and low informal sector participation.  Unlike the 
model developed here, these models are static and do not consider regulation, 
redistributive taxation or income inequality.  Ahmed, et al. (2004) consider 
redistributional taxation and social capital in an informal model with two-way causal 
relationship between inequality and informality.   
Closer to our model is Loayza (1996), which investigates the relationships 
between taxation, regulation and inequality in an endogenous growth model.  As in the 
model developed here, Loayza finds that regulation increases inequality and lowers 
growth.  A key difference is that, the formal sector is based on Barro (1990), so that 
taxation funds public goods rather than redistribution.  As a result, his model is incapable 
of supporting both the positive and negative relationships between inequality and growth 
that are found in the empirical literature.  In addition, we posit that it is something other 
than its ability to be taxed that makes the formal sector primary role the primary engine 
of growth.   
 
Section III.  Formal Model 
14  
In arguing for a link between informality and inequality, this paper follows in a 
development economics tradition established by Kuznets (1965) and Lewis (1954) of 
treating inequality as a manifestation of economic dualism.  We depart from this 
literature, however, in a number of ways.  First and most importantly, we treat growth as 
endogenous, rather than tracking the changes in income inequality that would result from 
modern sector expansion.  More specifically, we formalize the proposition that the 
modern sector is the “engine of growth.”  The growth rate of the economy becomes a 
function of modern sector participation and thus of the extent of dualism.  
Second, most development models define dualism in terms of the type of good 
produced, e.g. agricultural vs. manufactured, and treat dualism as resulting from labor 
market rigidities, in the form of either an institutionally determined subsistence wage in 
the traditional sector (Lewis, 1954) or a downwardly immobile modern sector wage 
(Harris and Todaro, 1970).  Here, dualism is captured in the formal-informal sector 
distinction, which operates along legal and technological dimensions.  Furthermore, 
informal sector participation is treated as a business decision by entrepreneurs faced with 
regulatory barriers to formality, rather than a labor market outcome, “underemployment.”  
This fits well with evidence that many informal sector participants are self-employed for 
work in family firms (XX).  In particular, informality results from policy-induced 
distortions, specifically regulations restricting formal sector access (De Soto, 1990).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a recent review.  
15 Production  
There is a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].  Agent i is endowed with i 
units of a non-accumulable resource called “ability” and hi units of human capital.  The 
distribution of ability defines a “natural” level of income inequality that would prevail in 
the absence of distortions.  Initial endowments of human capital conform to  , 
where h
1 ih hi =
1 is the human capital of the most able agent.  Restricting the initial distribution 
of human capital in this manner prevents the model from providing insights into the role 
of initial asset allocations on equilibrium growth and inequality.  As discussed below, 
however, the model quickly becomes intractable if this assumption is relaxed.  
Agent i may produce in the formal (F) or informal (I) sector, with outputs given 
by  
 
(1)   
α
i Fi i Fi h A h z = ) (
(2)  ,  
α
i Ii i Ii h A h z = ) (
 
where the A’s are productivity parameters, α ∈ (0, 1).  Initial levels of human capital are 
distributed according to  , where h is the human capital of the most able agent.    1 ih hi =
Productivity is heterogeneous across agents and sectors, with more able agents 
and formal sector producers enjoying a productivity premium.  A formal sector 
productivity premium may arise for a number of reasons.  Dessy and Pallage (2003) 
suggest that formal sector firms may be more successful in exploiting scale economies.  
This might be the case, for example, if large scale extralegal production invites predation 
16 by officials.  Alternately, formal sector firms may enjoy superior access to productive 
public goods, such as contract enforcement services (Loayza 1996, Johnson et al. 1997). 
We assume the productivity parameters reflect the influence of modern sector 
human capital spillovers.  This assumption serves to make the modern sector “the engine 
of growth.”  In practice, the modern sector of an economy uses intensively those types of 
capital typically associated with spillovers:  human capital and knowledge.  Furthermore, 
the modern sector enjoys greater ease of contracting, which may lead to a higher division 
of labor and greater interdependence among agents, both of which tend to promote 
spillovers.  Formal sector participation and greater ability play a role in allowing a given 
worker to capture knowledge spillovers, making the technology parameters agent and 
















where HF is total modern sector human capital.
8   
 
Taxation and Income  
Formal sector income is subject to proportional taxation at rate τ.  Tax revenues 
are distributed uniformly, with each agent receiving a transfer x.  The manner in which 
we treat taxation and transfers abstracts from a number of important issues regarding 
                                                           
8 If as proposed by Lucas (1988) spillovers reflect average rather than total human capital, then the addition 
of a less able worker to the formal sector will reduce the size of the spillover, lowering growth.  The 
drawback of formulation used here is that it generates scale effects.  The scale effect may be neutralized by 
assuming the relevant measure of scale is the size of a representative urban economy, rather than the 
national economy.   
17 their relationship to growth and inequality.  Income taxation may be progressive, in 
which case average and marginal tax rates will differ.  Tax rates may differ across factor 
incomes (XXXX).  Tax revenues may be used to fund productive government services, 
rather than transfers, as in Dessy and Palange (2003).  Finally, transfers may be means 
tested, increasing their equalizing effect on income, or in kind as in subsidized health 
care, in which case they will not show up in household income data. 
  Barriers to formal sector participation, described in detail below, partition agents 
according to their ability.  In particular, an agent participates in the informal sector if her 
ability falls below a critical value, i < n(β), where β is an index of the restrictiveness of 
regulatory barriers and n’(β) > 0.  It follows that n(β) is the informal sector’s share of 
employment.  Accounting for taxes, transfers and sectoral participation, agent i’s income 
is given by  
 




≥ + − =
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  If the tax rate is sufficiently high to completely offset the formal sector 
productivity premium, then all agents opt for informality.  This level of taxation would be 
hard to support as a political equilibrium.  In addition, in the absence of a formal sector, 
the productivity parameter Ai is zero.  For this reason, we assume in what follows that the 
tax rate is upwardly bounded τ < 1- γ ≡ τmax.  Since the most able agent is always a 
formal sector participant, we will omit the subscript “F” in referring to her, e.g.  .    1 1 F y y ≡
 
18 Dynamic Optimization  
  Each agent maximizes lifetime utility   where θ is the subjective 
discount rate subject to her initial endowment of human capital and accumulation 
equation  , where θ is the subjective discount rate.  Agents take policy 
parameters β and τ as given.  As is well-known, the transition dynamics for this problem 
do not admit an analytical solution.  For this reason, and because measures of inequality 
introduce significant complexity into the model, we concentrate the dynamic analysis on 
steady state outcomes.  In the steady state the return to capital is constant, and an agent’s 
income, consumption and human capital grow at a constant rate given by  
∫
∞ − =
0 ln dt c e U t
t θ
c y h − = &
 
(5)  θ − = r g .   
 
Sectoral Incomes in the Steady State  
Differentiating formal sector income with respect to human capital, agent i’s 
return to human capital is given by  
 
(6)   
1 1 1 ) 1 (
− − − − =
α α α τ α i F iF h i H r
 
With the return to capital constant, agent i’s human capital must grow at the same rate as 
the formal sector capital stock.  This occurs when the return to capital is equal across 
agents in the formal sector.  Equating (6) with r1, we find that steady state formal sector 
human capital is linear in ability:   
19  
(7)  .   
ss ss
Fi ih h 1 =
 
It follows that the steady state formal sector capital stock, return to capital, and income 
are  
 






















































where is the most able agent’s earned income.  x y w
ss ss − = 1 1
For an agent in the informal sector, the return to capital is given by  
 
(11)    []
1 1 − − =
α α αγ i F Ii h i H r
 
The return to capital will be constant provided hi and HF grow at the same rate.  This 
occurs when the return to capital is uniform across sectors.  Imposing this restriction, 
, gives the steady state level of informal sector human capital:  F Ii r r =
 
(12)    i h a h
ss
















τ a , with the inequality following from τ < τmax.   
Comparing equations (7) and (12), we see that formal sector participation 
increases an individual’s steady state level of human capital, a result that follows directly 
from the formal sector productivity premium.  This result captures the stylized fact that 
informal sector production is less capital and human capital intensive than formal sector 
production.   
Substituting (15) into (4) and manipulating, we find that steady state informal 
sector income is given by  
 
(16)    x i w a y
ss
Ii + = 1 ) (τ
 
Figure 1 shows steady state formal and informal sector incomes for all agents.   
Transfer payments are found by integrating tax revenues over formal sector 














































Regulatory Barriers and Sectoral Participation  
We model the regulatory barriers to formal sector participation in the simplest 
manner.  It is assumed that an agent may not participate in the formal sector if her 
21 earnings are below a predetermined level.  This level of earnings is defined as a given 
fraction β < 1 of the earnings of the ablest individual, such that it evolves overtime at the 
equilibrium growth rate.  Higher levels of β correspond to greater barriers to formality.  
The requirement for formal sector participation is thus 
 
(18)  1 F Fi w w β >  
 
This manner of formalizing regulation has several interpretations which 
correspond to existing regulatory structures.  First, in both developing and industrialized 
economies, formal sector participation may be limited by minimum wage legislation.  
Agents whose market determined wage in the formal sector would fall below this level 
barred from formal sector employment.  With a Cobb-Douglas production technology, 
payments for labor services are a constant share of earnings, so there is a direct 
relationship between minimum wages and minimum income restrictions.  
Second, many less developed countries employ minimum capital requirements for 
registering a new firm.  For example, the World Bank (2004, 118-20) lists minimum 
capital requirements for over ninety developing countries.  As shown above, in the steady 
state formal sector capital and income are linear in agent ability.  Thus the restriction on 
earnings is equivalent to requiring that an agent possess a certain fraction of the ablest 
agent’s capital, hi ≥ βh1.  In the same vein, there is a long tradition of treating formal 
sector employment as being rationed by educational attainment, a restriction that may 
also be interpreted in terms of a minimum capital requirement.  
22 Note that we have defined sectoral participation in such a manner that it is not 
sensitive to the tax rate.  Dessy and Pallage (2003) show that if taxation funds productive 
public services, an increase in the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on sectoral 
participation.  In addition, Johnson et al. (1997) find that informality among transition 
economies is related to perceptions of “tax fairness” but not statutory tax rates.  The 
model does, however, suggest a link between taxation and sectoral earnings differentials.  
An increase in taxes serves to offset some of the formal sector productivity premium, 
resulting in more similar levels of steady state human capital and earnings:  a’(τ) >0.   
Treating barriers to formal sector participation as a minimum income restriction, 
we find that in the steady state agent i participates in the formal sector provided i ≥ β, 
implying that informal sector participation is given by  
 
(19)  n(β) = β. 
 
  This outcome depends sensitively on several assumptions.  First, initial human capital is 
distributed according to hi = ih1, implying that formal sector participants are endowed 
with their steady state levels of human capital.  This assumption avoids complicated 
dynamic which arise due to presence of multiple equilibria, one in each sector, and the 
dependence of the return to capital on sectoral participation.  Transitions between sectors 
would occur, for example, if an agent had sufficiently high initial capital to start model 
time in the formal sector but insufficient ability to maintain this position.  Alternately, a 
high ability agent with low initial human capital might be drawn toward the informal 
23 sector steady state if her discount rate were sufficiently high.  While interesting in their 
own right, such outcomes preclude an analytic solution.   
Second, we assume that agents who may participate in the formal do so.  An agent 
with i ≥ β could decide to consume a portion of her capital and transition to the informal 
sector steady state, enjoying higher initial consumption at a cost of lower future 
consumption.  The differential equations describing the time path of consumption along 
this trajectory do not permit an analytical solution.  However, this option is less attractive 
the higher an agent’s valuation of future relative to current consumption, and we assume 
that θ is sufficiently low to preclude this option.   
 
Growth and Policy  
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24 An increase in taxes slows growth by reducing the after-tax return to capital.  A higher 
value of β reduces the number of formal sector participants, which lowers the knowledge 
spillovers generated in the formal sector.   
The lines in Figure 2 show iso-growth loci in the β−τ policy space, which are 
defined by combinations of β and τ that generate the same rate of steady state growth.  
The origin corresponds to the maximum growth rate, which occurs in the absence of 
redistribution and barriers to formality,  .   Growth is 
decreasing as one moves to lines further from the origin.  The slope of the iso-growth 
lines is given by   
θ α
α − = =
− 1
max 2 / ) 0 , 0 ( g g
 















Examination shows that the iso-growth lines become flatter in b and steeper in t, which 
accounts for their portrayal as “bowed-out.” 
 
Income Inequality and Policy  
  Income inequality is measured with a Gini coefficient.  The Gini coefficient 
varies from zero to one, with a higher value indicating greater income inequality.  The 
Gini may be derived as the sum of the absolute value of all pairwise income differentials 
divided by average income.  The Gini coefficient for our economy may be expressed as a 
function of the policy variables and model parameters:   
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Conceptually, the Gini coefficient may be thought of as the expected income difference 
between two individuals relative to average income (Pyatt, 1976).  For the derivation of 
the Gini coefficient and the following comparative static results, please see the appendix.   
Differentiating the Gini coefficient with respect to the tax rate, we find, very 
intuitively, that taxation reduces inequality:  Gτ < 0.  A rise in the tax rate reduces the 
inequality of earnings in both the formal and informal sectors, the latter effect operating 
through the impact of taxes on the level of steady state informal sector human capital.  
Since all taxes are redistributed, taxation has not effect on average income.   
Differentiating the inequality index with respect to β, we find that Gβ > 0 for β ≤ 
½.  That is, a country with higher barriers to formal sector participation will have greater 
income inequality.  An increase in the informal sector share has three separate impacts on 
inequality.  First, it lowers average income (relative to our reference variable, h1), 
increasing inequality.  Second, inequality falls because incomes are more uniform in the 
informal than formal sector:  the income differential between individuals i and j 
belonging to the same sector, is w1|i-j| if they are in the formal sector and a(τ)w1|i-j| if 
they are in the informal sector.  Third, due to the income gap between sectors, inequality 
is increasing in the probability that two randomly chosen individuals come from different 
sectors.  This probability is maximized when sector employment shares are equal, or β = 
½, and falls thereafter as the informal sector expands.   
26 Taken together, these comparative static imply that for β ≤ ½, iso-inequality loci 












.  These loci are 
shown in Figure 2.  Inequality rises as ones moves up the graph and to the left:  G0 < G1 
< G2.  In addition, the line labeled G1 passes through the origin, implying it corresponds 
to the level of inequality that holds in the absence of distortions:   6 / 1 ) 0 , 0 ( 1 = = G G .  
Given the complexity of the Gini coefficient, we have little confidence in assertions 
regarding the shape of the iso-equality lines, other than their positive slope.  In deference 
to our ignorance, we depict them as straight lines.  
 
An Interpretation of Implications for Growth and Inequality  
  Figure 2 summarizes the primary results of the model.  To interpret this figure, 
recall that barriers to formality reflect deep institutional structures, which are assumed to 
vary dramatically across countries but relatively little within countries over time, while 
rates of taxation and redistribution differ across both time and space.  Cross-country 
growth regressions therefore capture movements along the vertical axis.  Suppose we 
compare two countries, A and B, with the same tax rate τ1 and βA > βB, such that country 
A has more restrictive institutions.  As illustrated on the graph, country A will have a 
higher level of inequality, G2 > G1, and a lower growth rate, g1 < g0.  Thus, our 
observations will confirm that high growth is associated with low levels of inequality.   
Alternately, suppose we look at the relationship between growth and inequality 
within countries over time.  In this case, institutions are held constant and our 
observations capture movements along horizontal lines in Figure 2.  Suppose both 
27 country A and B raise their tax rates from τ1 to τ2.  In each country, both the growth rate 
and the Gini coefficient fall.  For example, in country A, the growth rate falls from g1 to 
g0 and inequality falls from G2 to G1.  Given these observations, we would conclude that 
lower inequality is associated with lower growth, the correlation found in empirical 
studies that consider growth and inequality within countries over time.  
The model also provides a potential explanation for Barro’s (2000) finding in a 
cross-country growth regression that growth and inequality are positively related for 
developed countries, though still negatively related for developing countries.  This would 
occur if, in looking across developed countries, most of the variation in the β−τ policy 
space were in the horizontal direction.  That is, if developed countries have relatively 
similar institutional and legal structures and differ strongly with respect to the extent of 
redistribution.  
So in investigating the impact of a higher value for beta, we are thinking of the 
implications of a change in beta at the start of model time.  It should be noted, however, 
that looking within a country over time, the impact of a change in beta is asymmetric 
with respect to its sign.   
A small rise in the in the barriers to formality will make steady state formality 
impossible for the marginal formal participant.  (More here)  However, a small fall in 
beta may be insufficient to attract the most able informal participant into the formal 
sector.  Even though formality would be a possibility, she begins with a significantly 
lower steady state stock of human capital than she needs in order to generate the income 
to legally join the formal sector:  a(τ)h1i rather than h1i.  This asymmetry may generate a 
ratcheting effect in which formality may be easily lost but is difficult to regain.  It also 
28 suggests that radical rather than incremental institutional changes may be necessary to 
remove the enduring effects of previous marginalization.   
 
I.V.  Conclusion 
 
Much theoretical work begins with an account of the primary stylized facts to be 
explained.  Due to conflicting evidence, this has been an awkward exercise for those 
attempting to explain the relationship between income inequality and growth.  For 
example, some recent papers cite only evidence supporting a positive or a negative 
relationship.  This paper attempts to suggests a way out, interpreting the evidence in a 
consistent fashion based on whether the variation observed is between or across 
countries.   
It does so by proposing a theoretical framework in which both inequality and 
growth are endogenous variables, functions of more fundamental policy parameters.  In 
doing so, we depart from the current approach of asking “Is inequality harmful for 
growth,” and ask instead “Are the particular circumstances that give rise to inequality in a 
given country good or bad for growth?”  This may be a more appealing approach for 
those who have found themselves uncomfortable with any claim of a fixed relationship 
between the two variables.   
Much of the energy around the issue of income inequality concerns the existence 
of an efficiency-equity trade-off:  is it possible to do well while doing good?  The model 
suggests that whether a trade-off exists depends on which dimension of policy one 
considers.  Along the dimension that corresponds to variations in redistributive policy, 
29 such a trade off appears to hold.  While decreasing inequality, increases in the intensity of 
redistributive policies will tend to blunt incentives for accumulation and slow growth.   
In considering the reform of policies that restrict access to the formal sector, 
however, no such trade-off exists.  Lowering barriers to formal sector participation 
reduces inequality while raising income levels and growth rates.  The ratcheting effects 
noted in the last section, however, suggests that marginal changes in institutional 
structure may be ineffective.  Restrictive institutions may generate impacts that persist 




This appendix derives the equation for the Gini coefficient.  To simplify the 
computation, we exploit similarities in steady state incomes to write:  
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Define g(i) as the cumulative income of the poorest i people, and y as average income.  
That is,  











































The Gini coefficient may be expressed as the integral over population of population share 
minus income share.  Then the Gini coefficient is given by  
(A.3)   
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Integrating over g(i), we have  
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Substituting this expression, and that for average income from (A.2), into (A.3), the Gini 
coefficient is given by  
(A.5)  [ ] [ ]
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which is the expression reported in the text.   
The complexity of this expression makes it difficult to sign comparative statics on 
inequality precisely.  In addition, it is well-known from work on the Kuznets hypothesis 
that in dualistic economies inequality rises and then falls as one sector’s share goes from 
zero to one, e.g. Robinson (1976).  Finding the sector share that constitutes maximum 
31 inequality involves solving a fourth order polynomial.  In lieu of this, I establish a range 
of parameter values that constitute sufficient conditions to sign the comparative static.   
The desired effects are that inequality rises in the barriers to formality and falls in 
the tax rate:   
























Since G(..) and m(..) are positive, a sufficient condition for the first expression to hold is 
that kβ ≥ 0 and mβ ≥0.  Differentiating k(..) and m(..) with respect to β, we have  
 (A.7) 
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It follows that Gβ > 0 for β ≤ 1/2 , as reported in (21).  
Differentiating k(..) and m(..) with respect to τ, we have  
 (A.8) 
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Iso-Inequality Lines:  heavy upward sloping lines showing 
combinations of β and τ that generate the same Gini coefficient.  
Inequality is increasing as one moves to the left:  G0 < G1 < G2.  G1 = 
1/6 corresponds to the level of inequality that occurs in the absence of 
distortions, β = τ = 0. 
 
Iso-Growth Lines:  heavy downward sloping curves showing 
combinations of β and τ that generate the same growth rate.  Growth 
is increasing as one moves toward the origin:  g0 < g1 < g2.  The origin 
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